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"To Dream the Impossible Dream": Globalization
and Harmonization of Environmental Laws
Alberto Bernabe-Riejkohlt
I. Introduction
Some day, the world will be environmentally safe. In this world,
there will be advanced technology. There will also be surpluses of
food, products, and energy supplies. These will be produced logically,
conscientiously, and without waste or pollution. This may sound like
an impossible dream, but it does not have to be. Unfortunately, unless
something is done to control the contradictions inherent in the global-
ization of the economy, it seems probable that this dream may never
come true.1
Increasingly, countries are entering into free-trade agreements. 2
In addition, recently concluded trade negotiations suggest the elimina-
tion of all trade barriers worldwide 3 and the creation of a World Trade
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I The conflict between the development of free trade policies and the creation and
enforcement of environmental policies is not limited to the American continent. By their
very nature, environmental issues may affect the whole world. Similarly, since the recently
completed Uruguay Round negotiations to eliminate worldwide trade barriers under the aus-
pices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) awaits ratification by the par-
ticipating countries, the conflicts between free trade and environmental policy may also soon
affect all nations. As of October 1994, however, only 26 out of the 124 GATT members had
ratified the agreements of the Uruguay Round. The two-door policy on trade, THE ECONOMIST,
Oct. 1, 1994, at 29. On November 29, 1994, the House of Representatives of the U.S. Con-
gress approved participation by the United States in the GATT by a vote of 288 to 146. Two
days later the Senate also voted to approve participation by a vote of 76 to 24. David E.
Sanger, Senate Approves Pact to Ease Trade Curbs; A Victoy for Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1994,
at Al.
2 See infra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
3 The recently concluded Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) is the most important agreement on international trade today. The GATT
has 124 signatories accounting for almost 90% of world trade. It was originally signed in
1947 and since then its Secretariat has sponsored periodic rounds of negotiations to reduce
tariffs. The Uruguay Round started seven years ago and it was the seventh round of negotia-
tions. This Round focused on expanding GATT to cover agriculture and services and on
eliminating many "non-tariff" barriers to trade. See Keith Bradsher, U.S. and Europe Clear the
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Organization, which would regulate world commerce and solve dis-
putes among the parties involved.4 This globalization of the economy,
however, has not been accompanied by a globalization of environmen-
tal protections.5 In theory, the policies of economic development, free
trade, environmental protection, and health and safety standards are
reconcilable. In practice, unfortunately, given the trend of global eco-
nomic development theories, the two ideologies seem to be incompati-
ble. For instance, many environmentalists consider the current trend
to expand free trade to be a threat to the environment, 6 while, in con-
trast, proponents of free trade view environmental regulation as a
threat to economic expansion. 7
In response to these conflicting views, parties to trade negotiations
have adopted several different approaches to accomodate the interests
of free trade and to simultaneously provide for the protection of the
environment. These approaches include the harmonization of laws,
the adoption of equivalence standards, and the creation of interna-
tional dispute resolution panels.8 None of these techniques, however,
Way for a World Accord on Trade, Setting Aside Major Disputes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1993, at Al;
Clark W. Lackert, Practitioners Hopeful That GATT's Promise Won't Come Up Empty, NAT'L L.J.,
May 16, 1994, at C41; David Moberg, The Morning NAFTA, IN THESE TIMES, Dec. 13, 1993, at
20, 21; Clare Nullis, No Agreement in Sight at World Roundtable, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Nov. 28,
1993, at 23. On September 27, 1994, the Clinton administration presented legislation to
implement the Uruguay Round accords of the GATT under the "fast-track" procedures that
require Congress to vote on the bill without amendments. 59 Fed. Reg. 218 (1993). This
request included a plea for "authority to include the right to make deals depend on trading
partners' environmental and labour standards." The two-door policy on trade, supra note 1, at
29. After Senate Republicans threatened to vote against the bill unless this condition was
dropped, the administration then dropped the whole request. Id. The final version of the
"bill ... changes many aspects of U.S. international trade." Lawrence Walders & Gregory
Menegaz, Amendments to Anti-Dumping Law are Debated, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 14, 1994, at C3.
4 The most recent accords in the Uruguay Round of the GATT created the World
Trade Organization (WTO) to take over the administration of the GATT in 1995. Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization, Part II of Final Act Embodying the Results
of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN/FA (Dec. 15,
1993), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 13 (1994) [hereinafter, WTO Establishment]. The WTO will
become the fourth major supranational entity, after the World Bank, the International Mon-
etary Fund, and the United Nations. Harvey Berkman, As GATT Gains, Will States Wane? New
World Trade Pact Could Erode Job, State Sovereignty, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 14, 1994, at Al. The WTO
will include all the countries who ratify the GATT. Each member will have a vote and no one
will have a veto. This organization will also be in charge of dispute resolution among parties
to the accord. WTO Establishment, supra, 33 I.L.M. at 13-27. The GATT's new structure
under the WTO has been described as "a system of international governance with powerful
legislative, executive and judicial authority over member nations." Ralph Nader, Drop the
GATT, THE NATION, Oct. 10, 1994, at 368.
5 Throughout this Article, reference to environmental protection will mean any action
by a governmental agency with the purpose of regulating the effects of industry over the
environment, including health and safety standards, and the preservation of biodiversity in
animal and plant species either on a national scale or as a means to protect the global
environment.
6 See infra part II.B.
7 See infra part II.A.
8 For a discussion of the alternative approaches, see Stanley M. Spracker et al., Environ-
mental Protection and International Trade: NAFTA as a Means of Eliminating Environmental Con-
tamination as a Competitive Advantage, 5 GEO. INT'L ENrL. L. REv. 669, 686 (1993); Richard B.
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has proven adequate to protect against threats to the environment,
and the reasons for this are many. First, these strategies are built upon
the premise that free trade is more important than protecting the envi-
ronment.9 In addition, they also have the effect of undermining sover-
eignty and democracy.10 Therefore, in the future, the only real hope
for protecting the environment lies in the adoption of new perspec-
tives for economic development.
In Part II of this Article, the theory behind free trade is discussed.
The conflict between the theory of free trade and the attempts by na-
tional and local governments toprotect the environment is addressed
in Part III. Finally, in Part IV, the author tries to determine whether
the conflict is irreconcilable.
II. The Case for Globalization and Free Trade
The movement toward the globalization of the economy is inter-
twined with the long history of capitalism's development as an interna-
tional economic system. As in the past, multinational enterprises in
competition have reacted to recurring economic stagnation crises by
reaching out for new markets and maximizing revenues through the
export of capital and the reorganization of manufacturing structures
around the world. 1 In the 1950s, for example, most of the expanding
foreign investment was concentrated in the exploitation of raw materi-
als and resource-based manufacturing. 12 Over the past decade, how-
ever, this trend has changed to an expansion of investments in finance
and to a reorganization of manufacturing enterprises all over the
world.1 3 In fact, more than one third of the U.S. "international trade"
during the late 1980s was actually intra firm trade.1 4
More recently, the movement toward the globalization of the
economy has been characterized by attempts to eliminate trade barri-
ers and tariffs through trade agreements and the formation of trading
blocs. The Uruguay Round agreements under the auspices of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATI), 15 the European Union
Stewart, International Trade and Environment: Lessons from the Federal Experience, 49 WASH. & LEE
L. Rav. 1329, 1335-37 (1992).
9 See infra part II.B.
10 See infra notes 99-121 and accompanying text.
I I Review of the Month: Globalization-To What End? Part I, MorrrHLY Rav., Feb. 1992, at 1, 2
[hereinafter Review of the Month Part I]; Laura B. Pincus et al., Legal Issues Involved in Corporate
Globalization, 1991 COLUM. Bus. L. Rav. 269, 270 (discussing the benefits of globalization).
12 Saskia Sassen, Economic Globalization: A New Geography, Composition and Institutional
Framework, in GLOBAL VISIONS 61, 62 (Jeremy Brecher et al. eds., 1993). See also Review of the
Month Part I, supra note 11, at 13-14.
13 Pincus et al., supra note 11, at 269-70.
14 Sassen, supra note 12, at 63.
15 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The Uru-
guay Round): Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN/FA (Dec. 15, 1993), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter GATT-Uruguay Round]. See also supra notes 2-4.
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(EU), 16 the United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement (CFTA), 17
and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 18 are just a
few examples of the global free-trade movement.
A. Proponents of the Free-Trade Movement
Proponents of free-trade agreements rely on several arguments to
support their cause. First, they argue that free trade will stimulate trad-
ing among nations with different comparative advantages in producing
goods, 19 which will bring economic benefit to all nations involved.2 0
16 The European Union was previously known as the European Economic Community.
TREATv ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY,], Mar. 25, 1987, 298
U.N.T.S. 11. The name changed as a result of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. Maastricht
Treaty on Political Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247, 255 (entered into force on Nov. 1,
1993).
17 The United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement (CFTA) was signed on January 2,
1988, and it was referred to Congress on July 25, 1988. Congress enacted the U.S.-Canada
Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act, and President Reagan signed the bill into law on
September 28, 1988. See U.S.-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L.
No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851 (1988) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (Supp. IV 1992)).
18 The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFrA) is an agreement to create a
free trading zone between Mexico, the United States, and Canada within the scope of the
GATT. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8 and 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32
I.L.M. 289 (1993) (hereinafter NAFTA]. Negotiations for the Agreement were announced
on October 7, 1992, in San Antonio. Gary N. Horlick & Amanda DeBusk, Dispute Resolution
under NAFFA: Building on the FTA, GATT and ICSID, in NAFTA: BUSINESS IMPLICATIONS AND
LEGAL RULES FOR THE WORLD'S LARGEST COMMON MARKET, AMERICAN CONFERENCE INSTITUTE,
1992, sec. XV, at 2 (citing Remarks at the Initializing Ceremony for the North American Free
Trade Agreement in San Antonio, Texas, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1877-78 (Oct. 7,
1992)). NAFTA was later ratified by the parties and entered into force on January 1, 1994.
The adoption of NAFTA did not diminish the importance of the Free-Trade Agreement be-
tween Canada and the United States. In fact, in regard to trade relations between the United
States and Canada, NAFTA expressly incorporates many provisions of the CFTA. For exam-
ple, the CFTA provisions regarding trade and investment in the automobile industry,
NAFTA, supra, at art. 300, 32 I.L.M. at 299, 320-21; tariff elimination in the textile industry,
Id. at art. 300, 32 I.L.M. at 327-37; Energy and Basic Petrochemicals, id. at Annex 608.2, 32
I.L.M. at 368, are all applicable to the United States and Canada under NAFTA. As part of
the negotiations for NAFTA, a new North American Environmental Commission was created,
and a plan for the border region between the United States and Mexico was adopted. How-
ever, these side agreements are not linked to the NAFIA Agreement itself, and they "could
easily die from lack of financing or lack of implementing authority." Jan Gilbreath, Environ-
ment and NAFTA: Changing our Approach to Trade Policy, in NAFTA: BUSINESS IMPLICATIONS
AND LEGAL RULES FOR THE WORLD'S LARGEST COMMON MARKET, AMERICAN CONFERENCE INSTI-
TUTE, 1992, sec. VI, at 1-2. See also GARY C. HUFBAUER &JEFFREYJ. SCHOTT, NAFTA: AN ASSESS-
MENT 98 (1993) (asserting that NAFTA supporters lack confidence in the United States and
Mexico's commitment to environmental provisions of the Agreement because of inadequate
enforcement funding). The Commission was a disappointment to many in the environmen-
tal community because they expected an entity "that would have considerably more authority
to carry out environmental policy in North America, including the ability to monitor for
regulatory compliance." Gilbreath, supra, at 9. Such powers would have to be established by
another agreement creating an institutional framework. Id. The Border Plan itself has been
criticized because it "does not commit the parties to specific projects, and it lacks a long-term
funding strategy." HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra, at 97. According to Hufbauer and Schott, the
United States would have to commit five billion dollars over the next five years to achieve the
goals of the border environmental programs. Id. at 149. However, the United States has
proposed only $379 million. Id.
19 Stewart, supra note 8, at 1329.
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Proponents also suggest that free-trade policies will eventually reduce
inequalities among countries by encouraging capital investment in
poorer countries.21 Finally, supporters of free trade claim that it en-
hances the welfare of all nations involved because wider markets pro-
mote competition, which enhances productivity, technological
innovation, and efficiency. 22
Advocates of free-trade policies also claim that the advantages are
not only for the producers in the countries involved. They claim that
consumers benefit economically from free trade as well. Advocates ar-
gue that free trade will provide consumers with more, better, and less
expensive products from which to choose among because products can
be traded without restriction between member countries.2 3 In turn,
this economic growth will lead to a higher standard of living. For ex-
ample, an active proponent of free trade in the United States has elo-
quently stated the theory in the following way:
The process of economic integration and trade liberalization is
accelerating throughout the world, particularly in western and eastern
Europe and in the Pacific Rim. The major nations of the world are
becoming more and more closely tied through trade, investment, and
capital transfers. Countries that do not seize the opportunities
opened up by these changes are in danger of being left behind.
Those that do are able to deliver rising standards of living to their
citizens. Dismantling barriers to trade and investment increases trade,
which in turn spurs economic growth, productivity gains, and job crea-
tion. Business benefits from predictable rules of doing business across
their borders. Consumers benefit from lower prices and a greater vari-
ety of products. Businesses and all trading partners realize gains in
efficiency. The bottom line is enhanced competitiveness for goods
and services traded from liberalized economies in the global
marketplace.
Expanding world trade also means greater prosperity for all .... 24
In sum, the argument is that free trade will generate economic
growth, which will lead to a higher standard of living for all parties
involved. Most influentially, this-goal has been adopted by the GATT
itself, which states that its purpose is "to contribute to a higher stan-
dard of living, full employment, [and] large and growing real
income."25
20 Id. at 1329-30.
21 Id. at 1330.
22 Id. These aspects of the economy are usually measured by the Gross National Prod-
uct (GNP).John B. Cobb,Jr., Growth Without Progress?, 15 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 45, 46
(1992).
23 Cobb, supra note 22, at 46, 49.
24 James R. Holbein, The Case for Free Trade, 15 Lov. L.A. INT'L & COMp. L.J. 19, 20
(1992). When this article, The Case for Free Trade, was published, the author was "the Acting
Director, Office of Latin America, United States Commerce Department. He [was] responsi-
ble for trade policy and business counseling/export promotion for all of Latin America and
the Caribbean countries except Mexico. He [was] also the United States Secretary for the
United States/Canada Free Trade Agreement Binational Secretariat." Id. at 19.
25 Peter L. Lallas et al., Environmental Protection and International Trade: Toward Mutually
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B. The Other Side (or Costs) of Free Trade
In reality, however, free-trade advocates present only part of the
picture. Globalization is a movement toward the expansion of mar-
kets, and in all market-based competition there are winners and losers.
In recent years, it has become apparent that the environment can be
one of the losers in the trend toward indiscriminate economic develop-
ment. The possible consequences of competition-driven, low environ-
mental standards are undoubtedly serious. Some examples of the
consequences of unrestrained free trade are the deterioration of the
ozone layer, global warming, deforestation, water and air pollution,
massive oil and chemical spills, acid rain, waste disposal, and nuclear
hazards. As Herman Daly and Robert Goodland, two members of the
environmental department of the World Bank, have stated: "Interna-
tional capital mobility, coupled with free trade of products, stimulates
a standards-lowering competition to attract capital: wages can be low-
ered, as can health insurance, worker safety standards, environmental
standards, etc." 26
The development of the border regions between Mexico and the
United States and between Canada and the United States, for example,
demonstrates that many manufacturers have disregarded the environ-
ment when trying to gain a competitive advantage.2 7 The reason for
this environmental "unfriendliness" is obvious: It is more profitable to
Supportive Rules and Policies, 16 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 271, 275 (1992) (citing General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Jan. 1, 1948, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S.
194 (Preamble)).
26 Alexander Cockburn, The Executioner's Song: Clinton, Labor and Free Trade, THE NA-
TION, Nov. 2, 1992, at 489, 508.
27 The situation has been described as follows:
Economic development in the U.S.-Mexico border region has occurred
largely without enforcement of environmental law by either the United States
or Mexico, and the region provides a vivid warning as to the environmental
consequences of uncontrolled industrial growth. Simply put, virtually every
medium (water, land and air) in the border region has been in some way signif-
icantly degraded by unfettered growth. The region's surface waters are verita-
ble sewers, thick with human feces and industrial toxins. The subsurface water
tables, upon which the arid region is highly dependent for both human and
industrial consumption needs, are similarly compromised. Toxic hot spots, ar-
eas where industrial and often hazardous and/or toxic wastes have been dis-
posed of without regard for law or the environment, dot the region's
landscape. Hazardous wastes are routinely burned by landfill operators, releas-
ing dangerous levels of toxic compounds into the region's air. The human
costs of these environmental tragedies are only now beginning to be
recognized.
To a lesser degree, the United States-Canada border shares many of these
same environmental ill effects caused by North American economic activity in
the absence of sufficient environmental protections. A recent study conducted
by the Sierra Club found that the Great Lakes were a 'toxic soup' of more than
500 chemicals. In 1990, U.S. companies alone dumped more than 680 million
pounds of toxic chemicals into the Great Lakes.
Robert Housman et al., Enforcement of Environmental Laws Under a Supplemental Agreement to the
North American Free Trade Agreement, 5 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 593, 595-96 (1993) (footnotes
omitted).
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conduct business without having to comply with environmental regula-
tions. 28 Obviously, this competitive advantage and high return on
profits is very appealing; however, it is also a very dangerous threat to
the environment.
III. The Conflict Between Free-Trade and Environmental
Protection Policies
Rather than focusing on the maximization of profits, the theory
behind environmental protection is based on the premise that protect-
ing the environment is "objectively necessary in itself."29 Environmen-
talists argue that environmental protection is fundamental to the
survival of the planet and, therefore, it cannot be restricted simply to
advance the values of economic development. Instead, they believe
economic development has to be environmentally safe, and environ-
mental advocates often do not believe that proponents of economic
development and trade can be trusted to protect "the environmental
inheritance of future generations."30
For these reasons, environmental protection policies frequently
come into conflict with economic policies, including free-trade theo-
ries. In an attempt to protect the environment or the health of its
citizens, for example, a country may create barriers to the importation
of foreign products that do not meet the country's regulations or that
it considers hazardous to the environment. For instance, a country
may decide to prohibit the sale of vegetables produced with high levels
of pesticides or the importation of products that release chlorofluoro-
carbons. In addition, a country may decide to encourage better manu-
facturing practices abroad by creating barriers to the importation of
products that are manufactured by environmentally dangerous
processes, even if the products themselves are not dangerous. For ex-
ample, a country may decide to ban the import of tuna caught with
fishing nets that accidentally kill dolphins. These measures have inter-
national consequences. If foreign producers want to sell their prod-
ucts in the country that has enacted these regulations, they would have
to modify their production procedures. For example, they would have
to limit the use of pesticides, eliminate the use of chlorofluorocarbons,
and design new ways to fish for tuna.
To the proponents of free trade any one of these approaches to
environmental, health, and safety standards would constitute a protec-
28 According to one study, for example, "companies can increase profit margins by
more than two hundred percent by not meeting environmental laws." Id. at 597 (citing
FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, RELEASE, STANDARDS DowN, PROFITS UP! (Jan. 1993)).
29 Robert F. Housman, A Kantian Approach to Trade and the Environment, 49 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 1373, 1374 (1992) (citing ROGERJ. SULLIVAN, IMMANUEL KANT'S MORAL THEORY 50
(1989)).
SO Richard A. Johnson, Commentary: Trade Sanctions and Environmental Objectives in the
NAFTA, 5 GEO. INT'L ENVrL. L. REv. 577, 581 (1993).
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tionist obstacle to free trade, because imports from countries that do
not meet the regulations could be eliminated. Because the regulations
have an effect on trade, even though they are not specifically related to
it, they are considered "non-tariff trade barriers" that operate as obsta-
cles to economic development.3 1 To reduce these barriers, countries
which are members of free-trade agreements and trading blocs have
tried to harmonize the approaches towards environmental protection
taken by the different countries. They have also addressed this threat
of "disguised protectionism" by providing remedies to the parties af-
fected by the non-tariff barriers. The GATT, the CFTA, and the
NAFTA all address these issues in detail.
A. Harmonization of Standards
In contrast with the changing structure of the world's economy,
the political structure of the planet remains unchanged. It is Still com-
posed of hundreds of individual nation states, each one with its own
laws and regulations on economic development and the environ-
ment.32 This fractionalization creates a contradiction in the globaliza-
tion movement because the world economy is not characterized by
stable cooperation among states. Given the disparity of regulations,
countries have to "harmonize" their laws to avoid obstructing free
trade and economic development, especially as they organize into eco-
nomic alliances or transnational trading blocs. Unfortunately, during
this process, the movement to eliminate trade barriers and to promote
free trade directly conflicts with the individual efforts of nations to pro-
tect the environment.
For example, one approach taken by multinational agreements to
solve the conflict between national and environmental standards and
free trade is the adoption of uniform standards for all the parties in-
volved in a free-trade agreement. Given the current world political
structure, this is a problematic approach. For the same reason, it is.
also the least promising. To be successful, it would require some sort
of international or global planning of the economy. It would also "re-
31 In response to a complaint by the United States against the European Union's deci-
sion to ban the import of hormone treated beef and to South Korea's dispute over the al-
leged use of a carcinogen by American grapefruit growers, "USTR [United States Trade
Representative] Carla Hills [was led] to declare that without additional international guide-
lines, health and safety standards could become 'the trade barrier of choice in the 1990s.' "
"Big Green"Style Pesticide Laws Could Endanger Uruguay Round, EC Warns U.S., 7 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at 1263 (Aug. 15, 1990).
32 It is interesting to note that even in the European Union (EU), the tendency is to go
back to nationalist policies. It has been reported recently that a new movement toward eco-
nomic regionalism is transforming Europe's economic and political landscape. See William
Drozdiak, Regions Take Reign in Europe, CHICAGO SUN-TiMES, June 5, 1994, at 39. The recent
elections for the European Parliament saw a record low turnout. Also, many of the winners
were representatives of nationalist or anti-European Union parties. SeeJeremy Gaunt, EU,
Beset by Voter Apathy, Seeks Direction, CHICAGO Su N-TiMEs,June 19, 1994, at 38. In Denmark, for
example, anti-Union groups received more than 25% of the votes. Id.
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quire [ ] closer industrial linkages, technology transfers, and more for-
mal economic institutions." 33
1. GATT as an Example of Harmonization of Standards
An example of this harmonization approach is the GATT's Agree-
ment on Technical Barriers to Trade of 1979 (Standards Code), which
encourages states to use international standards and concludes that
the indiscriminate use of national standards could create barriers to
trade.34 This Code has been described as "a significant multilateral
effort to prevent or discourage the use of technical standards as artifi-
cial barriers to trade."35 However, it has also been criticized because it
provides very little help in solving the issues of environmental protec-
tion. In addition, the Code is not mandatory, and as originally en-
acted, it did nothing but suggest a global harmonization of standards.
A further blow to environmental protection came with the Dunkel
Draft Amendments of 1991. These Amendments changed the lan-
guage of the Standards Code to allow the parties to raise their stan-
dards "in the least trade restrictive way."36 This modification appears
to suggest the parties should use the lowest agreeable standard possi-
ble. The Code, therefore, appears to limit the efforts of countries that
want to adopt higher standards of environmental protection.
2. NAFTA as an Example of Harmonization of Standards
The drafters of the NAFTA adopted a different approach than the
GATT, but the results are similar. NAFTA recognizes the right of the
parties to "adopt, maintain or apply any standards-related measure, in-
cluding any such measure relating to safety, the protection of human,
animal or plant life or health, the environment or consumers, and any
measure to ensure its enforcement or implementation." 37 However,
the scope of this right is extremely limited. Chapter 9 of the NAFTA
deals with voluntary and governmental product and service stan-
dards.38 Currently, however, the only services covered by this Chapter
are land transportation and telecommunication services.3 9 The
NAFTA recognizes the need for the parties to establish and enforce
standards, 40 but it attempts to ensure that they do not create unneces-
33 Gilbreath, supra note 18, at 4.
34 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 405, 1186
U.N.T.S. 276, reprinted in General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Basic Instruments and
Selected Documents 8 (26th Supp. 8 1980).
35 Gilbreath, supra note 18, at 3.
36 Id.
37 NAFTA, supra note 18, at art. 904, 32 I.L.M. at 387.
38 See The North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, ch. 9, sec. A(1)
(1993), available in 1993 WL 561157 (N.A.F.T.A.), at *1 [hereinafter NAFTA Implementation
Act].
9 1d. sec. A(5), at *3.
40 The Chapter also recognizes the rights of the parties to adopt, maintain, or apply
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sary obstacles to trade.41 The parties' rights, therefore, are limited to
instances where the measure: (1) uses international standards as a
guideline, 42 (2) is not a disguised trade barrier,43 and (3) is compati-
ble with standards of the other parties. 44
In a separate chapter, the NAFTA recognizes rights of the parties
to issue and enforce agriculture sanitary and phytosanitary measures 45
to protect human, animal, or plant life from a limited amount of
risks.46 However, such protective measures are allowed "only to the
extent necessary" and only when it does not create unjustified discrimi-
nation between goods of one member party and like goods of an-
other.47 Once again, these restrictions can be interpreted to limit the
effort of the parties to the "least trade restrictive" measure possible.
Also, with the objective of making the measures equivalent for all
parties, the NAIFTA requires that they be based on international stan-
dards and be proven to be based on scientific evidence and on a risk
measures "to prohibit the importation of a good of another Party or the provision of a service
by a service provider of another Party that fails to comply with the applicable requirements"
of the NAFrA country that adopted the measure. NAFTA, supra note 18, at art. 904(1), 32
I.L.M. at 387.
41 NAFTA Implementation Act, supra note 38, ch. 9, sec. A(8), at *4.
42 Article 905(1) of the NAFTA requires the parties to use "relevant international stan-
dards.. ., except where such standards would be ineffective or inappropriate means to fulfill
its legitimate objectives, for example because of fundamental climactic, geographical, climac-
tic, technological or infrastructural factors... " NAFTA, supra note 18, at art. 905(1), 32
I.L.M. at 387. In such a case, the parties could apply standards that could provide a higher
level of protection than the applicable international standard. Id. at art. 905(3), 32 I.L.M. at
387.
43 Article 904(3) of the NAFTA requires the parties to treat goods and services from the
other parties no less favorably than like goods or services of national origin. Id. at art.
904(3), 32 I.L.M. at 387. Article 904(4) prohibits the adoption of measures thatwould create
"unnecessary obstacle[s] to trade between the Parties." Id. at art. 904(4), 32 I.L.M. at 387.
44 See supra note 42.
45 "Sanitary and phytosanitary ("S&P") measures generally deal with protecting human,
animal and plant life from risks of plant- and animal-borne pests and diseases, and additives
and contaminants in foods and feedstuffs." See The North American Free Trade Agreement
Implementation Act, ch. 7, sec. B(A)(1), 1993, available in 1993 WL 561155 (N.A.F.T.A.), at
*1. For example, a country may require that products that pose a risk of introducing a dis-
ease be treated to eliminate it. See id. sec. B(A) (3), at *2. The summary defines sanitary or
phytosanitary measure as any measure to:
- protect animal or plant life or health in its territory from risks arising from the
introduction, establishment or spread of a pest or disease,
- protect human or animal life or health in its territory from risks arising from
the presence of an additive, contaminant, toxin or disease causing organism in
a food, beverage or feedstuff,
- protect human life or health in its territory from the risks arising from a dis-
ease-causing organism or pest carried by an animal or plant, or a product
thereof, or
- prevent or limit other damage in its territory arising from the introduction,
establishment or spread of a pest....
Id. sec. B(A) (4) (a), at *2-3.
46 Id. These measures are exempt from the national treatment requirement of Chapter
III, Article 301. See NAFTA, supra note 18, at art. 710, 32 I.L.M. at 377.
47 NAFTA, supra note 18, at art. 712(4)-(5), 32 I.L.M. at 378. TERENCE P. STEWART,
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, A SUMMARY 27-28 (1992).
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assessment of the circumstances. 48 This scientific proof is difficult to
obtain in many cases, particularly where the national standards are
based on responses to social demands or environmental tragedies
rather than on scientific research. 49 Finally, the parties are en-
couraged to attempt to achieve equivalence in their measures. In case
of a dispute, the decision of whether an environmental measure com-
plies with any of these requirements would be decided by a dispute
resolution panel. 50
The NAFTA, however, fails to provide any incentive for the har-
monization of manufacturing process standards. It simply does not ad-
dress the possible interest of a party in regulating the importation of
goods manufactured by dangerous processes when the products them-
selves are not dangerous.51 Such an attempt at harmonizing manufac-
turing process standards could probably be successfully challenged as a
trade restriction.
3. EU and Harmonization Efforts
Given that one of the ultimate goals of the European Union is to
unify its members politically, it is not surprising that of all the multilat-
eral arrangements to date, the EU has made the most advances toward
the harmonization of trade and environmental standards. While the
main players in the American continent have refused to prepare an
environmental impact statement as part of the negotiation for trade
agreements, 52 the EU has declared explicitly that environmental pro-
tection is one of its goals. Unfortunately, however, even following the
approach of the EU, the inherent conflict between free trade and pro-
tection of the environment has allowed only very limited results. The
creation of a globally planned economy under a unified political and
legislative structure is incompatible with the current political develop-
ment of the globalization movement.
48 NAFTA, supra note 18, at art. 713, 32 I.L.M. at 378. The parties are encouraged to
participate in international standardizing organizations and to promote the development
and review of international standards, guidelines, and recommendations. STEWART, supra
note 47, at 27-28.
49 Gilbreath, supra note 18, at 3.
50 See infra notes 63-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dispute resolu-
tion systems under different multilateral agreements.
51 For example, a country may catch tuna with a process that endangers another species
of animals or may produce an agricultural product in a way that damages a water source that
crosses national borders. The tuna or the agricultural product is neither damaged nor dan-
gerous, but the processes through which they are produced create risks to either the global
environment, or the environment of the country of origin of the products or of the other
parties to the dispute.
52 Patti A. Goldman, Resolving the Trade and Environment Debate: In Search of a Neutral
Forum and Neutral Principles, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1279, 1284 (1992). In fact, "[njeither
the Office of the United States Trade Representative (Office), nor its predecessor, has ever
prepared an environmental impact statement on a trade agreement. In litigation over the
Office's refusal to prepare such statements on the Uruguay Round and NAFTA, the Office
made it clear that it has no intention of ever doing so." Id.
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The effort to create a unified internal market in Europe started
thirty-seven years ago when the Treaty of Rome in 1957 created the
European Economic Community (EEC).53 The goal of the EEC was to
create a common market free of restrictions on the movement of
goods, services, people, and capital. 54 One specific goal of the Treaty
of Rome was the elimination of tariff barriers. 55 Since 1957, most tar-
iffs have been eliminated, but there are many "non-tariff barriers" still
in place that hinder free trade between Member States of the EU.
Many of these "non-tariff barriers" are environmental, health, and
safety regulations.56
In addition, other goals specifically addressed by the EU include
the protection of the environment and the elimination of regional dis-
parities through environmental and social cohesion. 57 In contrast with
the efforts to harmonize free trade and environmental protection on
the American continent, the EU views economic development and en-
vironmental policies as interdependent. The existence of this goal re-
cently prompted a decision by the European Court of Justice, which
recognized that the protection of the environment could justify a
Member State's regulation even if it affected free trade.58
In that case, the European Commission challenged a Danish regu-
lation that required all bottles in Denmark to be reusable. The Court
held that the regulation was justified because it was aimed at protect-
ing the environment, which is one of the objectives of the EU.59 It was
the first time the Court held that an environmental regulation could
be justified even when it clearly affected free trade.6° Decisions like
this one are promising, but some problems remain unsolved. The de-
53 See supra note 16.
54 John Riggs, An Overview of 1992 and EC Institutions: Executive, Legislative and Judicial
Processes, in ABA NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON FRONTIERS OF EUROPEAN LITIGATION: 1992 AND BE-
YOND 3 (1991).
55 Id. at 2.
56 Id. at 4.
5 7 JamesJ. Friedberg, Closing the Gap Between Word and Deed in European Community Envi-
ronmental Policy, 15 Loy. L.A. INT'L & Comp. L.J. 275, 284 (1993) (citing EEC TR.Arv, supra
note 16, at arts. 130(a), 130(r) (as amended 1987)); see also ERNEST WISTRICH, AFTER 1992:
THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE 64-76 (rev. ed. 1991) (discussing policies behind the EU's aim
for social cohesion). By requiring certain minimum environmental and safety standards
before a country can become a member, the EU has tried to limit downward harmonization
and prevent the widening of the gap in development among member states. This rule was
applied in the cases of Portugal, Spain, and Greece. These countries required help to im-
prove their standards and create some infrastructure to enforce it before they were allowed
to become full members of the community. Id. at 69. This approach could have been taken
in the cases of Mexico, the United States, and Canada during the negotiations of the NAFTA.
58 Ludwig Kramer, Environmental Protection and Article 30 EEC Treaty, 30 COMMON MKT. L.
REv. 111, 121 (1993) (citing Case 302/86, Commission v. Denmark, 1988 E.C.R. 4607). Toni
R.F. Sexton, Enacting National Environmental Laws More Stringent than Other States' Laws in the
European Community: Re Disposable Beer Cans: Commission v. Denmark, 24 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
563, 564 (1991).
59 Case 302/86, Commission v. Denmark, 1988 E.C.R. 4607.
60 Sexton, supra note 58, at 564.
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cision only refers to the rights of countries to deal with issues not yet
addressed by the EU. It does not address whether a regulation would
be valid if a state attempted to impose a higher standard than one
adopted by the EU.6 1
The difficulty of developing a regional envirohmental policy dem-
onstrates the need for a global approach to the problem. Indeed, even
if all the countries in Europe decide to act together, the resulting poli-
cies would only have a limited effect globally if other countries in the
world do not act accordingly. The benefit to the global environment
would be limited, for example, if all the countries in Europe decide to
stop manufacturing products that damage the ozone layer but the rest
of the world continues to do SO. 6 2 Also, if the production of these
products is less expensive and more profitable, it would place the Eu-
ropean producers at such a disadvantage which may cause them to re-
vert back to producing ozone-depleting products to face the
competition.
Finally, given the GATT's emphasis on dispute resolution, the
EU's attempt to develop regional approaches to the conflict between
free trade and environmental protection may not be effective. Even if
the European continent decides to adopt certain standards for all the
members of the EU, other GATT members who are not members of
the EU could challenge the EU standards as non-tariff barriers before
dispute resolution panels. A harmonized standard for all Europe
would have little impact on the global environment if other countries
could have a GATT panel declare it void as a violation of international
trade rules.
B. Dispute Resolution
Dispute resolution in international tribunals is the second ap-
proach taken by multilateral agreements to regulate the use of trade
barriers. The European Court ofJustice, for example, has jurisdiction
over complaints against EU members that limit free trade. The GATT
and the NAFTA give similar jurisdiction to dispute resolution panels. 63
61 Id. at 587-88, 593.
62 The fact that national governments have different priorities in terms of environmen-
tal issues creates a difficult problem. For example, commentators in Europe and the United
States have complained about how the United States has not moved quickly enough to agree
to global environmental policies regarding the ozone layer, global warming, and biodiversity.
Friedberg, supra note 57, at 282-83. There was an outcry in Germany, for example, when
President Bush refused to sign the Species Protection Convention alleging it would hurt the
American biotechnology industry. Petra Kelly, A Very Bad Way to Enter the Next Century, in
GLOBAL VISIONS, supra note 12, at 133, 142. See also Howard G. Buffet, US. Shuni Major Role
After Rio Earth Summit, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Sept. 4, 1994, at 40 (criticizing the fact that the
United States has not ratified the Convention on Biodiversity of the Rio Earth Summit and
did not attend the conference of the parties for the Biodiversity Convention). In the two
years since the Convention was signed, it has been ratified by the European Union and nearly
seventy countries, including Japan, Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Id.
63 See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947,
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In all cases, the task of the tribunal is to determine whether the na-
tional environmental regulation is a valid restriction on trade. When
the regulation is obviously discriminatory, the decision is a simple one.
A country in a multilateral free-trade agreement generally cannot im-
pose regulations on'foreign products that it does not impose on similar
domestic products. Articles I and III of the GATT, for example, pro-
vide that the parties to the Agreement shall accord no less favorable
treatment than that given to comparable goods manufactured in their
own territory with respect to all laws, regulations, and requirements
affecting their internal sale. 64 Similarly, Article 301 of the NAFTA im-
poses the same obligation on its signatories by incorporating Article III
of the GATT by reference. 65
However, most cases are not that simple. Controversies often arise
when regulations operate as barriers to foreign products without di-
rectly discriminating against them. For example, if Denmark requires
all bottles sold in its territory to be recyclable, other European manu-
facturers may be affected if they have less access to recyclable materials.
On its face, the regulation applies equally to all manufacturers domes-
tic or foreign. Nevertheless, it has a discriminatory effect on some for-
eign manufacturers. In this type of case, the tribunals must determine
if the regulation's effect on free trade is justified.
All environmental regulations ever reviewed by GATT dispute res-
olution panels have been declared invalid as violations of free-trade
rules.6 6 In fact, the GATT provides the best example of the limitations
of dispute resolution as a method of harmonizing environmental laws.
Article XX(b) of the GATT allows unilateral bans on importing prod-
ucts that are hazardous to life or health, but only if the ban is not a
"disguised restriction on international trade" and the measure is "nec-
art. XXIII, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 60-61, 55 U.NT.S. 187, 266-68 [hereinafter GATT]. There
are three different dispute resolution mechanisms in the NAFTA. Chapter 11, subchapter B
provides the rules for disputes between a party and an investor from another party; Chapter
19 provides the rules for disputes related to antidumping and countervailing duty laws; and
Chapter 20 provides rules for disputes among the parties themselves. Articles of Chapter 20
parallel articles of Chapter 18 of the CFTA. For a detailed discussion of all these mechanisms
and rules, see Horlick & DeBusk, supra note 18; William Graham, Dispute Resolution and Insti-
tutions of NAFTA: Preliminary Observations, in NAFTA: BUSINESS IMPLICATIONS AND LEGAL
RULES FOR THE WoRLD's LARGEST COMMON MARKET, AMERICAN CONFERENCE INSTITUTE, 1992,
sec. XVI; Jose L. Siqueiros, NAFIA Institutional Arrangements and Dispute Settlement Procedures,
in NAFTA: BUSINESS IMPLICATIONS AND LEGAL RULES FOR THE WORLD'S LARGEST COMMON
MARKET, AMERICAN CONFERENCE INSTITUTE, 1992, sec. XVII. Article 2005 of the NAFFA states
that if a dispute arises under both NAFTA and the GATT, the parties must attempt to agree
on the appropriate forum, except in cases of disputes related to environmental matters which
shall be decided only by NAFTA dispute resolution panels. See NAFTA, supra note 18, at art.
2005, 32 I.L.M. at 694.
64 GATT, supra note 63, at arts. I, 111(2), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 8-9, 14, 55 U.N.T.S. at 196-
98, 206.
65 See NAFTA, supra note 18, at art. 301, 32 I.L.M. at 299.
66 Elizabeth E. Kruis, The United States Trade Embargo on Mexican Tuna: A Necessary Con-
servationist Measure or an Unfair Trade Barrier?, 14 Loy. L.A. Irr'L & CoMp. L.J. 903, 928 (1992).
[VOL. 20
HARMONIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
essary" to achieve this end.67 However, in a controversy involving the
trade of tuna, a dispute resolution panel recently interpreted this Arti-
cle in a way that limits the ability of the parties to the GATT to recon-
cile environmental and trade policies. 68
On August 28, 1990, a federal District Court ordered the U.S. De-
partment of Commerce to ban the importation of tuna from five na-
tions which used methods that violated the standards imposed by the
Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA).69 According to the MMPA,
tuna caught by enterprises using methods that did not meet the stan-
dards imposed by the Act could not be imported into the United
States.70 The MMPA also banned tuna imported from a nation that
had itself imported tuna from nations failing to meet the standards. 71
The ban was applied to Mexico, which has the second largest and most
modern tuna fleet in the world. 72 A large portion of Mexico's tuna
exports go to the United States and to nations that also export tuna to
the United States. 73 In November 1990, Mexico challenged the ban
and requested a GATT panel to mediate the dispute.
Mexico argued, among other things, that the MMPA violated the
non-discriminatory national treatment principles of Article III of the
GATT and constituted a disguised protectionist measure because it dis-
criminated between domestic and imported products based on the
production process.74 The United States argued in response that the
measures were needed to protect animal life and therefore, were ex-
empt from the no less favorable treatment principles. 75
The Dispute Resolution Panel (Panel) held that the ban violated
the rules of the international trading system. 76 First, it found that a
country could not ban an import because it objects to the process
through which it is produced. 77 In addition, the Panel decided that
Article XX(b) of the GATT does not extend to "extrajurisdictional"
measures by a member country.78
The decision of the Panel was not officially adopted by the GAT"
67 GATT, supra note 63, at art. XX(b), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 56-57, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262.
See Robert Housman & Durwood Zaelke, Trade, Environment, and Sustainable Development: A
Primer, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 535, 546 (1992).
68 Kruis, supra note 66, at 905 n.18 (citing United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna:
Report of the Pane4 GATT Doc. DS21/R, at 50-51 (Sept. 3, 1991) [hereinafter Panel Report]).
69 Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988) [hereinafter MMPA].
Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964, 976 (N.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd, 929 F.2d 1449
(9th Cir. 1991).
70 MMPA, supra note 69, 16 U.S.C. § 1371.
71 Id.
72 Kruis, supra note 66, at 914.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 916 (citing Panel Report, supra note 68).
75 Id. at 919.
76 Id. at 920-21, 923.
77 Id. at 920.
78 Id. at 921, 924.
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Council because the dispute was settled.79 However, the decision in-
volved the only section of the GATT that deals with the environment,8 0
and has far-reaching consequences. 8 1 The interpretation of the Panel
leaves virtually no possibility under Article XX for nations to justify an
environmental regulation that affects trade.8 2 The Panel's interpreta-
tion also eliminates the possibility of unilateral regulations to protect
the global environment. In addition, the decision invalidates the use
of secondary boycotts, like the one imposed by the MMPA and ordered
by the District Court,83 on nations that trade with countries to which a
ban applies directly.
Although the dispute resolution mechanisms of the NAFTA are
somewhat different, there is no reason to believe that they would lead
to a different result in similar circumstances. Both the NAFTA and the
GATT, in one way or another, subject the validity of national environ-
mental and safety measures to the needs of trade. Chapters 7 and 9 of
the NAFTA, which appear to allow the parties to adopt national regula-
tions to protect the environment, are in fact severely limited by re-
quirements to ensure that they do not create unnecessary obstacles to
trade.8 4 These inherent limits of the dispute resolution process seri-
ously frustrate the attempts of national governments to maintain the
adopted level of environmental protection when challenged in inter-
national tribunals.
IV. The Irreconcilable Nature of the Conflict
The problem with global environmental protection is not that in-
dividual governments are not willing to enact legislation to protect
their countries. Rather, the main problem is that the conflict usually
appears. in the negotiation and creation of international alliances
79 Donald A. Carr, Environmental Considerations of the North American Free Trade Agreement,
in NAFTA: BUSINESS IMPLICATIONS AND LEGAL RULES FOR THE WORLD'S LARGEST COMMON
MARKET, AMERICAN CONFERENCE INSTITUTE, 1992, sec. VII, at 4.
80 The word "environment" does not appear anywhere in the GAT. However, the
Agreement does have language suggesting that measures needed to protect human, animal,
or plant life, or related to the conservation of exhaustible resources are exempt from interna-
tional trade controls. GATT, supra note 63, at arts. XX(b), XX(g), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 56-
57, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262. See Housman & Zaelke, supra note 67, at 546-51. The United States
used these two sections to argue that the tuna embargo was not in violation of the GATIT.
The term "environment" was not incorporated into GATT documents until the 1979 Stan-
dards Code. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text. The Code clarified this exception
and explained that environmental considerations could justify departures from international
standards only as long as they are not disguised trade barriers or unjustified burdens on
commerce. Carr, supra note 79, at 3.
81 One commentator has used this decision as the best example to conclude that the
GATT's approach to environmental controversies is "anachronistic." See Carr, supra note 79,
at 4.
82 Kruis, supra note 66, at 928. A similar position was adopted by the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in its Rio Declaration. See infra
note 85.
83 See Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 785 F. Supp. at 826, 828 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
84 See supra notes 37-51 and accompanying text.
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where players in the world market are specifically promoting free-trade
interests. The movement toward the globalization of the economy
based on free trade rests on the underlying premise that free trade is a
more valuable objective than environmental protection. Therefore,
furthering free-trade interests may limit the ability of a country to ad-
dress many environmental, health, and safety concerns. In fact, it may
actually defeat some of the national and local efforts to deal with these
issues.8 5
The argument that environmental protection should be
subordinated to free trade is based on the theory of "economic
growth." Environmental problems can be dealt with more effectively
85 Another component of the conflict between free trade policies and environmental
protection regulation is the fact that while free traders are attempting to achieve economic
growth through globalization, there is less of an organized effort to protect simultaneously
the global environment. Even though there are many international treaties that attempt to
globalize environmental protection, they are limited in scope and apply only to those coun-
tries that voluntarily decide to participate in them. In addition, many are nonbinding agree-
ments. The Montreal Protocol, for example, which attempts to limit the amount of ozone-
depleting substances, does not cover all the products that affect the ozone layer and has not
been signed by all the countries in the world (not even all the members of the GATT).
Housman & Zaelke, supra note 67, at 578-80. In other words, as of yet, there is no worldwide
commitment to address the global problem of the depletion of the ozone layer.
The efforts of the United Nations on the environmental question are also fragmentary.
Indeed, not all nations are members of the United Nations, and the General Assembly has
already opposed the use of environmental measures as trade restrictions. Id. at 588. Like-
wise, the recent summit of the UNCED in Rio deJaneiro did not advance much in the area of
international agreements toward the protection of the environment. The "achievements" of
this summit have been described by one commentator as follows:
It produced an ambitious but ultimately vague, watered down, and unenforce-
able list of good intentions for the next century called Agenda 21. It concluded
a treaty on biodiversity that is likewise vague, toothless, contains no significant
funding, and fails to assure that the benefits of biotechnology accrue com-
monly to humankind or that the dangers of biotechnology are monitored. It
concluded a climate change treaty that fails to set specific targets or methods of
reduction for greenhouse gases. It announced a forest policy that is vague and
without implementing machinery.
Robert W. Benson, The Threat of Trade, the Failure of Politics and Law, and the Need for Direct
Citizen Action in the Global Environmental Crisis, 15 Loy. L.A. INrr'L & COMP. L.J. 1, 12 (1992).
The declaration also adopted a principle that opposes "disguised restrictions" on trade
in the name of environmental protection. It has been argued that this principle places "an
almost impossible burden on the proponents of international environmental agreements
containing trade-related enforcement measures since it is almost impossible to achieve an
international consensus." Housman & Zaelke, supra note 67, at 588-89. Principle 12 of the
Rio Declaration states:
States should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international eco-
nomic system that would lead to economic growth and sustainable develop-
ment in all countries, to better address the problems of environmental
degradation. Trade policy measures for environmental purposes should not
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised
restriction on international trade. Unilateral actions to deal with environmen-
tal challenges outside the jurisdiction of the importing country should be
avoided. Environmental measures addressing transboundary or global environ-
mental problems should, as far as possible, be based on an international
consensus.
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, U.N. Doc. A/
Conf.151/5/Rev.1, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874, 878 (1992).
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once the countries have acquired the monetary means to address
them. From the perspective of the free trader, it is logical to argue
that a country can afford to destroy the environment now, because free
trade will allow it to acquire the means to clean it up later. Indeed, this
.we can afford to destroy" theory was part of the arguments in support
for the NAFTA and the GATT.86
This perspective on environmental protection, which subordi-
nates it to free-trade theory, is truly inadequate. First, the underlying
theories of globalization and free trade simply do not reflect reality.
Economic growth or development, particularly as measured by a coun-
try's Gross National Product (GNP), is not the best indicator of "pro-
gress" or of better living conditions.87 This link between free trade
and growth is "more often asserted than explained,"8 8 and it has been
described as "one of the most widely held, yet most difficult to prove,
ideas in economics." 89 Given this poorly explained source of free-
trade theory, several economists have set out to question the theory of
"growth" based on free trade as measured by the GNP.90 One com-
mentator has criticized the basis of the free-trade "growth" theory by
arguing:
The answer is that what is sought is primarily growth of market
activity. This is what GNP chiefly measures, and policies directed to
the increase of GNP consistently focus on increasing this activity. It is
assumed that people become economically better off as market activity
increases....
It is obvious that it [GNP] includes elements that do not reflect
well-being .... Similarly, as crime increases, the costs of fighting it
86 In the Environmental Protection Agency's Integrated Environmental Plan for the
Mexican-U.S. Border Area, the Bush administration "emphasize[d] its view that the NAFTA
would result in environmental improvement in Mexico because it would result in a higher
Mexican standard of living." Frederick M. Abbott, Integration Without Institutions: The NAFTA
Mutation of the EC Model and the Future of the GATTRegime, 40 AM.J. Comp. L. 917, 938 (1992).
Many commentators and supporters of free trade also espouse this view. See, e.g., Thomas J.
Schoenbaum, AGORA: Trade and Environment, Free International Trade and Protection of the Envi-
ronment: Irreconcilable Conflict?, 86 AM.J. INT'L L. 700, 702 (1992) (arguing that trade liberali-
zation would help the environment because it would ensure economic growth, which
according to the author "will create the financial means, particularly for developing coun-
tries, to control pollution and protect the environment").
87 See Benson, supra note 85, at 7; Cobb, supra note 22; Herman E. Daly, From Adjust-
ment to Sustainable Development: The Obstacle of Free Trade, 15 Loy. L.A. Ir'L & COMp. L.J. 33
(1992); Review of the Month Part I, supra note 11; Review of the Month: Globalization-To What
End? Part II, MoNTLY REv., Mar. 1992 [hereinafter Review of the Month Part II].
88 Peter Passell, How Free Trade Prompts Growth: A Primer, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 15, 1993, at
Al. David Sanger, commenting on the vote in the House of Representatives regarding the
implementing legislation for the GATT, stated that "[i]t was clear from the debate today,
however, that even supporters of the accord have only the vaguest views of what it would
mean for the nation's economy." David E. Sanger, The Lame-Duck Congress: The Vote; House
Approves Trade Agreement by a Wide Margin, 288-146, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1994, at Al.
89 Passell, supra note 88, at Al. Peter Passell has provided perhaps the most accurate
description of the explanation behind the theory of free trade: "Free trade means growth.
Free trade means growth. Free trade means growth. Just say it 50 more times and all doubts
will melt away." Id.
90 See Cobb, supra note 22, at 57-61; Daly, supra note 87, at 42-44.
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rise. But although that causes the GNP to grow, the economic welfare
of the people is not improved. 91
In addition, using more complete economic indicators, ProfessorJohn
Cobb has concluded that the United States showed a regression in liv-
ing standards between 1978 and 1988, even though it also showed
traditional "economic growth."92 Others have concluded that the re-
cent global expansion of the economy has been accompanied in most
countries by a rise in unemployment and a decline in earnings among
the lower third or even the bottom half of the earnings distribution.9 3
As stated by one commentator in evaluating the lessons learned from a
recent conference on free trade and the environment in Latin
America:
Traditional economic growth refers to growth of the market economy
based upon consumption of non-renewable resources. Mere eco-
nomic growth has become confused with economic health, develop-
ment, or progress. The only reason traditional economic growth is
considered growth at all is due to the statistical sleight of hand called
GNP. In reality, GNP ignores many real costs such as depletion of
non-renewable resources, and environmental, health, social, and polit-
ical costs and disregards relevant beings outside the formal market-
place .... Increments in GNP may actually reflect regress rather than
progress even for present generations.
94
These studies should lead to a re-evaluation of the policy of economic
growth based on the globalization of free trade.9 5 Accordingly, they
91 Cobb, supra note 22, at 50.
92 Id. at 56. See also Review of the Month Part , supra note 11, at 7-8 (describing the
decline in percent average annual growth despite an increase in Gross Domestic Product of
industrialized nations); Review of the Month Part II, supra note 87, at 10-13 (showing the con-
tinued widening of the gap between developed and undeveloped nations).
93 Sassen, supra note 12, at 61, 65.
94 Benson, supra note 85, at 7.
95 This kind of attack on globalization has come from all levels of the political spec-
trum. For example, Cuauht6moc Cirdenas, the Mexican presidential candidate for the Par-
tido de la Revoluci6n Democrhtica (PRD), has argued that "if one relies only on the effects of
market forces, social contrasts become deeper and the gaps in the development of the econo-
mies become wider." Sassen, supra note 12, at xii. Similarly, Ralph Nader, the nationally
recognized consumer advocate, has concluded that the result of participating in the GATT"
"will be a weakening of living standards and a chilling of proposed environmental ad-
vances ...." Nader, supra note 4, at 369. On the other hand,James Goldsmith, a conservative
billionaire who was recently seeking a seat in the European Parliament, has argued that
"global free trade will produce chaos for the many but financial bliss for a few." See George
Will, Gatt Spawns A Dark Vision: New Proletariat, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, June 12, 1994, at 50. He
has been quoted as stating that it will produce social divisions "deeper than anything Marx
anticipated." Id. Similarly,John Nash,Jr., counsel for the largest U.S. privately-owned textile
manufacturer, has stated:
Countries in our own hemisphere that are following the free-trade model and
boosting their GNP are at the same time increasing the number of poor they
have by millions. GATT will do the same here .... Free trade tends to benefit
the top 20 percent of our country. Productivity is up, GNP is up and overall
wages are stagnant or down.
Berkman, supra note 4, at A26. Most recently, this kind of attack was seen during the debates
in Congress about the implementing legislation on the GATT. Representative Marcy Kaptur,
a Democrat from Ohio, for example, argued that the past 47 years of GATT have not helped
American workers. Sanger, supra note 88, at Al.
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should also lead to a review of the idea that environmental protection
can wait until countries acquire growth.
Moreover, the development of a globalized economy is not nar-
rowing the gap between the developed and the less developed coun-
tries in the world. If anything, the gap has continued to widen. 96 Also,
the environmental damage that accompanies globalized development
has proven to be very uneven. Those who suffer most of the cost of
environmental harms are usually not the ones who benefit from the
economic growth.9 7
The perspective on environmental protection :based on free-trade
theory is also unsatisfactory because the GATT's approach to unilateral
restrictions is inadequate. Unilateral pressure on environmentally
harmful processes has proven to be an effective way to address global
environmental policies. For example, the secondary boycott imposed
by the United States on the import of Japanese pearls in an attempt to
protect sea turtles was successful in pressuring the Japanese to agree to
eliminate their imports of turtle products from other nations.98
In addition, the approach to harmonization taken by multina-
tional agreements, such as the NAFTA and the GATT, threatens the
sovereignty of the nations involved in the agreements and particularly,
the sovereignty of their states or provinces. 99 A constantly increasing
number of environmental regulations are created by local govern-
ments. 10 0 For example, some states in the United States restrict the
sale of chlorofluorocarbons and beef hormones. 10 1 However, if a
country is a member of the GATT, it must ensure that all of its states
act in accordance with the Agreement. 0 2 If a state's regulations vio-
96 See Review of the Month Part II, supra note 87, at 10, 15-16 (arguing that the trend
toward globalization leads to greater expansion of the economy by inducing greater national
debt and aggravating the gap between the first world and dependent countries and affecting
the living conditions of most people in all countries).
97 See Edith B. Weiss, Environmentally Sustainable Competitiveness. A Comment, 102 YALE L.J.
2123, 2127 (1993) (arguing that "the poor and disadvantaged often bear a disproportionate
share of environmental costs. . . . It is they who are disproportionately exposed to toxic
chemicals, breathe dirty air, drink polluted water, and are forced by poverty to exploit soils,
forests and other resources in an unsustainable manner.").
98 Stewart, supra note 8, at 1359.
99 In a recent article, Ralph Nader summarized the arguments against the new GATT
agreements as follows:
[S]erious issues of sovereignty and democracy are at stake. Membership in the
WTO would commit the United States to make its laws and regulations con-
form to the WTO's decisions and rules. That means adhering to a regime that
places trade uber ulles, that subordinates all nontrade values and policies-such as
consumer, environment and workplace standards-to the imperatives of foreign
commerce. And the WTO regime will be enforced by closed, secretive WTO
tribunals without citizen or even subnational (i.e. state and local) input.
Nader, supra note 4, at 368-69.
100 Housman et al., supra note 27, at 601.
101 1t
102 See GATT, supra note 63, at art. XXIV:(6), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 63-64, 55 U.N.T.S. at
272. See Housman & Zaelke, supra note 67, at 552.
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late the GATT, the whole country is in violation of the GATT.10 3
In undermining national or state sovereignty, the approach of the
NAFTA and the GATT to harmonization could also undermine the
standards adopted by individual national governments. Any country
can challenge the regulations enacted by a state or region of another
GAT member country before a dispute resolution panel. If the inter-
national panel declares a state's regulation invalid as a restriction on
trade, the federal government could nullify it, or the winning country
could retaliate against single states. 10 4 However, individuals, state or
regional governments, and non-government organizations are not al-
lowed to participate. in the panel's proceedings, neither to present nor
to receive information.' 0 5 The decisions of the GATT panels are usu-
ally not made public "until the GATT Council adopts the determina-
tion of the GATT dispute settlement panel." 0 6 Most nations,
including the United States, also refuse to make public their submis-
sions to GATT panels.10 7 Therefore, while the process is active, there
is no assurance that the government is representing the best interests
of the states or their citizens.' 0 8 In this way, democratically elected
bodies (and the citizens they represent) find themselves subject to re-
view by international panels in which they have no representation.10 9
Worried about the impact that the GATT would have on their sov-
ereignty, thirty-four states of the United States have agreed to form a
Multistate Tax Commission to study, among other things, the effects of
the GATT on multistate and multinational business."10 This Commis-
sion has already declared that the states are "deeply concerned" be-
cause the fate of state regulations could be determined by foreign
judges in tribunals where "[t]he states [will not] have standing to de-
fend themselves."'1 1 The states are also concerned about state-federal
103 Housman & Zaelke, supra note 67, at 552.
104 See Berkman, supra note 4, at A26.
105 Housman, supra note 29, at 1387; Housman & Zaelke, supra note 67, at 558; Gold-
man, supra note 52, at 1285-86.
106 Goldman, supra note 52, at 1285. This type of secrecy is required to an even greater
extent by the text of the NAFTA. Id. at 1286.
107 Id.
108 Housman, supra note 29, at 1387.
109 The NAFTA negotiations themselves are an example of poor democratic representa-
tion. All draft agreements and summaries of the negotiations were kept secret. Even after
the final agreement had been reached, the United States refused to provide the public with
its terms. Goldman, supra note 52, at 1283 (citing Letter from the Office of the United States
Trade Representative to Public Citizen (Aug. 19, 1992) (on file with author); Letter from
Public Citizen to the Office of the United States Trade Representative (Aug. 17, 1992) (on
file with author)). See also Sen. Moynihan Says NAFTA Text Should Be Provided to Public, 9 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at 1416 (Aug. 19, 1992); Gephardt Urges Bush to Reveal Details of
Proposed North American Trade Pact, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at 1567 (Sept. 2, 1992).
Also, the process for the approval of the NAFTA was held through a "fast track" procedure,
which forced Congress to vote on the agreement without being able to suggest amendments
and with less time to discuss it than they would have had under normal circumstances.
110 See Berkman, supra note 4, at A26.
I See id.
19951
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
relations because they have to rely on the federal government, which
could ultimately sue under the supremacy clause to strike any laws
found to be illegal under GATT.' 12
In Europe, this concern over sovereignty is also evident. Anxious
to guard their sovereign powers, the fifteen national governments of
the members of the European Union are currently challenging the au-
thority of the European Commission, the Union's unelected adminis-
tration, to be the sole negotiator on trade issues.113 The controversy
may delay ratification by the European governments of the recently
concluded GATT accords. 114
Some of the results of the CFTA are good examples of the harm-
ful effects of subjecting environmental regulations to revision by inter-
national bodies with no state representation. This approach has led to
the adoption of the weakest common regulation between the
countries:
The CFTA has functioned both as a sword to attack more strin-
gent domestic environmental regulation and as a shield to protect less
stringent environmental and health standards. For instance, both U.S.
and Canadian entities have used the CFTA and GATT prohibitions on
non-tariff trade barriers to challenge the other nation's domestic envi-
ronmental laws....
Moreover, harmonization as required under CFTA arguably has
resulted in lower environmental standards and reduced import protec-
tions at the border. For example, Canadian pesticide regulations now
are set using the U.S. risk-benefit model rather than the more strin-
gent precautionary model previously used in the Canadian regula-
tions. In addition, a "streamlined" random meat inspection system to
further the CFTA goal of reducing trade restrictions replaced inspec-
tion of Canadian meat at the U.S. border. 115
Further, harmonization under the CFTA has resulted in the invalida-
tion of the efforts to protect the Pacific salmon' 1 6 and in the "elimina-
tion of Canadian controls over the exportation of energy to the United
States."' 17 This elimination of controls has created great "obstacles to
ongoing international efforts to address the threat of global
warming."118
112 Id. The Multistate Tax Commission asked the Clinton administration to include a
provision in the GATT implementing legislation to require the executive branch to get con-
gressional approval before it could sue a state. The administration agreed to require notice
but not approval or permission. Id. The administration also agreed to require the Office of
the United States Trade Representative to give the states information about challenges to
state laws and "to work closely with them in the laws' defense," which may include "the possi-
bility of allowing themselves [state representatives] to address the GATT panels." Id.
113 See The EU and trade: The GATT sat on the mat, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 1, 1994, at 70.
Interestingly, though, the European governments apparently agree that the Commission
should have the exclusive authority to negotiate environmental matters. Id.
114 Id.
115 Housman & Zaelke, supra note 67, at 575-77 (footnotes omitted).
116 Id. at 575.
117 Id. at 577.
118 Id.
[VOL. 20
HARMONIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
The Tuna-Dolphin panel decision is another good example of the
threat to national democracy and sovereignty.119 Before the decision
in that case, the citizens of the United States, through their democrati-
cally elected representatives, decided that they wanted to protect dol-
phins from the risk of extinction. Unfortunately, given the movement
for the globalization of free trade, those same members of society do
not have the last word in decisions of this type. The decision was sub-
jected to the review of an international panel not elected by those citi-
zens.120 This panel decided that the decision of the democratically
elected bodies lacked justification.12 1 The decision practically elimi-
nated the possibility of using Article XX of the GATT to justify environ-
mental regulations that affect trade. In sum, the lack of a coherent
harmonization effort in the major multinational agreements, with its
accompanying reliance on dispute resolution remedies, may eventually
eliminate the ability of the parties to enforce their own standards.
V. Conclusion
At first, the case for free trade and economic growth is very ap-
pealing. An increase in trade will encourage investment, stimulate the
economy, enhance productivity, increase the standard of living, and
raise the Gross National Product of all countries involved. Unfortu-
nately, the case for free trade is also extremely dangerous. Free-trade
theory seems to be based on the assumption that we can continue to
produce and consume forever without damaging the environment and
that protection of the environment can wait until we achieve "eco-
nomic growth."
Yet, the history of the development of the border regions of the
United States and the results of free-trade policies do not support the
conclusions offered by free-trade proponents. Certainly, improve-
ments in the standard of living are always welcome, but there are dif-
ferent ways to achieve this end. The fact remains that we live in a finite
world with limited resources. Simply increasing production and mar-
ket trade without regard for the environment can lead to negative
results.
119 Id. at 597-98.
120 Attacks on the effect of GATT on national sovereignty have also come from different
ends of the political spectrum. Ralph Nader, backed by most of the U.S. environmental
community, has asserted that GATT's panels "threaten the nation's web of state and federal
environmental and consumer protection laws by requiring that such laws be the 'least trade-
restrictive' means to achieve their ends." Berkman, supra note 4, at Al. He has also stated
that participation in the WTO is "an absurd step backward" that would override laws when
the United States is forced to obey the directives of the WTO or to pay large fines. Steven
Taylor, The '90s Nader, NAT'L JuRusT, Oct.-Nov. 1994, at 10, 13. On the other end of the
spectrum, well-known conservative analyst Pat Buchanan has called GATT "globaloney" and
has argued that it will "speed the erosion of the nation's manufacturing base, not to mention
what's left of its sovereignty." Berkman, supra note 4, at A26.
121 See supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text.
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Many proponents of free trade argue that there is no better alter-
native. To them, the suggestion that there may be a different way to
organize economic growth is unthinkable because in their eyes it
would lead to "chaos."1 22 In response, it may be suggested that a
globalization plan that leads to weaker environmental protection,
lower health and safety standards, lower wages, and less democratic
participation is not very promising. It is time to begin to consider al-
ternatives-alternatives that would lead to some kind of sustainable de-
velopment without the risks of unregulated free trade. 123
The European Union has made some limited progress in this di-
rection. The Single European Act (SEA) recognizes environmental
quality as a good in and of itself and commits the EU to its protec-
tion.12 4 The SEA is also committed to eliminating disparities in devel-
opment among nations to avoid downward harmonization. This
commitment has required regional planning and regulation which has
interfered with competition among producers affecting their possible
profits, as in the case of the Danish bottle recycling case.' 25
Unfortunately, global development and environmental protection
cannot be achieved by organizing one continent alone. It must not be
forgotten that even though the countries in Europe belong to the
same economic community, they are still in economic competition
with each other and with the rest of the world. In the end, the success
of the EU has been limited precisely by enterprises protective of their
profits, and member states concerned about sovereignty and protective
of their industries.1 26
As long as market competition is the driving force of economic
development, there will be a need to find a way to get ahead by maxi-
122 Schoenbaum, supra note 86, at 703, (arguing that "[i]f every country were allowed to
impose its own domestic environmental standards on other countries, the result would not
be greater environmental protection but chaos and anarchy").
123 The most radical alternatives are global in nature and would require a new way of
organizing the economy on a world scale emphasizing joint design or products and manufac-
turing processes. See, e.g., HUFBAUER & SCHoTr, supra note 18, at 100. However, even within
the context of free-trade agreements as they exist now, some suggestions are possible. For
example, the parties to a free-trade agreement could agree to exclude new members until
they achieve a certain level of environmental protection infrastructure, as in the EU. See
supra note 57 and accompanying text. If a country in a trade agreement fails to enforce its
standards or if the parties cannot agree to common standards, then an environmental tax (or
"green fee") could be imposed on all imports from that country. See HUFBAUER & SCHoTr,
supra note 18, at XX; Peter Lallas, NAFTA and Evolving Approaches to Identify and Address "Indi-
rect"Environmental Impacts of International Trade, 5 GEO. INT'L ENVrL. L. REv. 519, 548 (1993).
However, these alternatives were rejected during the negotiations of the NAFTA. Id. An-
other rejected alternative would have been to require an environmental impact study before
the agreement could be approved. See Goldman, supra note 52, at 1284. The fact that these
alternatives seem unacceptable to those who negotiated the most recent free-trade agree-
ment is yet another example of how inadequate free-trade theory is to advance sustainable
development.
124 Single European Act, 1987 0.J. (L 169) 1.
125 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
126 Friedberg, supra note 57, at 276-77.
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mizing profits. Unfortunately, the environment is usually one of the
losers in this economic battle. Given all this, then, is there any hope
that the dream of environmental protection can actually come true or
is it really an impossible dream? It seems that to achieve the dream,
the ideal of economic growth based on production and market activity
must be modified or abandoned. Globalization must be achieved with
better values in mind. Growth for the sake of profits will not raise the
standard of living, eliminate the differences among nations, or allow
sustainable development by conserving resources. In the future,
growth will have to be controlled through efficiency and high stan-
dards and not be based only on competition and consumption. Eco-
nomic power needs to be taken away from the corporations that take
advantage of the environment and placed closer to the people who are
expecting to get the benefits of it. A free-trade treaty can only improve
environmental and living conditions if it sets high standards on envi-
ronmental protection, production processes, health and safety, and if
it guarantees their enforcement through upward harmonization.
Economic development and the rules that regulate it also have to
be more democratic. The whole process of dispute resolution has to
be opened up to allow participation by the public. It also has to be
more receptive to environmental concerns, at least by admitting ex-
perts and evidence in fields other than trade. This change is essential
to the future of the environment. Also, the democratic decisions of
the citizens should not be subject to the rule of multinational agencies
in the name of free trade and "growth." International trade policies
should not prevail over the decisions of the citizens of a country to
adopt laws to protect the environment. Such unilateral environmental
protection policies should be allowed in an effort to develop interna-
tional agreements on environmental issues.
In conclusion, if we are going to think in terms of global eco-
nomic development, we must think about global economic planning
and environmental protection simultaneously. All this, of course, is
heresy to free traders. It would lead to chaos; it would mean the end of
the world as we know it. Well, that is the point indeed. To avoid a
future environmental collapse we do need to end the world as we know
it. We need to create a new one; one where dreams can come true.
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